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This article offers insights into how the storytelling aspects of the Donald Trump
presidential campaign of 2016 contributed to the rise of the Trump movement and
paved his way to the White House. With 50 Trump speeches being analysed, the
study reconstructs the narrative Donald Trump communicated to the target audience on his way to the highest office. Exploring the idea of Donald Trump as a
storyteller, the article discusses how the ideology of the Trump base was constructed
and an eagerness to participate was ignited by the narrative. Methodologically,
the article derives the seven principles of political storytelling from its theoretical
framework and applies them as an analytical frame to the analysis of the narrative
structure of the Trump campaign. The seven principles suggest that the political
narrative benefits from being targeted, empathic, happy-ending, consistent, well
delivered, well communicated and engaging.
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The function of narrative
Narrative is a method of ‘ordering experience and making sense’ (Bamberg
2011: 79). The idea of a narrative as a sense-making practice highlights its interpretative function that makes a narrative ‘the primary form by which human
experience is made meaningful’ (Polkinghorne 1988: 1). In Gudmundsdottir’s
view, ‘[b]y using narrative form we assign meaning to events and invest them
with coherence, integrity, fullness and closure’ (1995: 31). Narratives turn the
discrete phenomena of social reality into a coherent system of events and ‘give
sense to the behaviour of others’ (Polkinghorne 1988: 14). Concomitantly,
narratives help us to understand ourselves and play a crucial role in creating
our self-representations (Bamberg 2011: 2). Along with an individual identity,
the sense-making function of narrative contributes to the creation of collective
identities or ‘group consciousness’ that are associated with ‘a political awareness or ideology regarding the group’s relative position in society along with a
commitment to collective action aimed at realizing the group’s interest’ (Miller
et al. 1981: 495), which is well studied on the example of racial minorities for
instance (McClain et al. 2009; Miller et al. 1981).
At the same time, a narrative as an interpretative means is not a perfect
mirror of reality. According to Shkedi, ‘narratives are interpretative tools
that constitute a practical, but also highly selective perspective’ (2005: 11).
By ‘moralizing reality’ (Gudmundsdottir 1995), narratives make their interpretations of events subjective. In this regard, Bruner (1991) compares a
narrative with the logical scientific mode of reality construction, concluding that the reality portrayed by a narrative as a method of making sense
can only achieve ‘verisimilitude’ but cannot be verified in a scientific sense.
Even those narrative forms that claim to document events as they were, like
chronicles or reports, are distorted by the author’s always-limited knowledge, his or her vision of what is important to the story and what can be
omitted, and so on.
However, ‘highly selective perspective’ of narratives confers ‘moral
significance’ (Gudmundsdottir 1995) to the reality they portray. That is what
Herman and Vervaeck (2013) define as ‘ideology’ of a narrative that is ‘the
frame of values’ informing the narrative and installing ‘hierarchical relationships between pairs of oppositional terms such as real vs false, good vs bad
and beautiful vs ugly’. Polkinghorne also highlights the ideological nature
of narratives, arguing that at the cultural level ‘narratives serve to give cohesion to shared beliefs and to transmit values’ (1988: 14). Empowered with
the ethical ‘road map’ of a narrative, people can build their own strategies
in the actual world. Thus, narratives can be seen as a means of empowering people as they create clarity for action and give the feeling of moral
certainty.
Interestingly, the biased nature of narratives makes it ‘more resonant with
the human experience than the traditional mode of communication that is
used in positivistic-quantitative studies’ as a method of making sense of the
world (Shkedi 2005: 11). That can be explained by the fact that the audience
also looks at the world through the filter of their own ideology, and creates
clarity in expense of complexity through a certain degree of simplification.
Empowering people with a mechanism to make sense of reality, narratives – and their storytellers –- simultaneously gain the power to change that
reality by infiltrating people’s minds with subjective visions of it. Reflecting on
Vygotsky’s works, Jerome Bruner argues that ‘cultural products, like language
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and other symbolic systems, mediate thought and place their stamp on our
representations of reality’ (1991: 3). In so doing, stories may affect people’s
actions and change the world we live in. With all that being said, the ability
of a narrative to shape reality is not necessarily all-powerful; it can also be
heavily constrained by the way narratives are consumed and produced in the
actual world. In the sense of consumption, selective exposure discriminates
the narratives whose ‘ideology’ lacks ‘verisimilitude’ in the eye of the consumer.
As Frederick Mayer puts it, ‘when we use narrative to make meaning […] we
are reinforcing our general worldview through the particular’ (2014: 71). As
pinpointed by uses and gratification theory, the audience must be conceived of
as active, which means ‘an important part of mass media use is assumed to
be goal directed’ (Katz et al. 1973: 510). Among those goals, or gratifications,
value reinforcement and social utility can be highlighted (Katz et al. 1973:
513). Selective exposure implies that stories are selected on the basis of their
ability to support our world-view. According to the self-affirmation theory by
Claude Steele, individuals resist changing their beliefs and therefore tend to
use defensive adaptations, including avoidance of the information contradicting their world-view (Sherman and Cohen 2006; Steele 1988).
In the sense of production, the power of narratives to affect things is
limited if production is driven by the marketing logic of a storyteller. Although
it has been widely argued – by Horkheimer and Adorno (2002), for instance –
that culture is a means of manipulation and oppression, businesses and politicians habitually try to learn and please people’s tastes rather than challenge
them, which is the most obvious winning strategy on a competitive market of
products and ideas. Narratives, therefore, often originate from an audience.
They try to be like the audience, especially if the main goal is to promote a
product or a candidate. Narratives – or, rather, storytellers – want to be liked,
and that limits their freedom to differ significantly from what the target audience wants them to be.
But if the narrative succeeds in connecting with the ‘ideology’ of its
consumers, reflecting on the real issues of its target audience and connecting
with their everyday concerns, this turns stories into powerful mechanisms for
engaging with individuals on a very intimate level of their personal worldview, generating enthusiasm and triggering engagement, a ‘subjective disposition that motivates realization’ (Dahlgren 2013: 25).

Methodology
Based on the outlined theoretical premise, the following elements of effective storytelling in politics can be specified and applied to the analysis of the
narrative structure of the Trump campaign:
1. Targeted story: A story for everyone is a story for no one. Narrative has to
work with a well-defined target audience.
2. Empathic story: A successful narrative resonates with the ‘ideology’ of its
audience, addresses the relevant issues.
3. Happy ending: A narrative has to give hope and offer solutions.
4. Consistent story: Taken together, the messages of a campaign have to form
a solid narrative.
5. Well-delivered story: A story that no one has heard does not exist. A story
has to be delivered to its audience by means of relevant online-and-offline
channels.
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6. Well-communicated story: A good message requires a good messenger who
can be a genuine part of the narrative that he or she communicates.
7. Engaging story: Finally, the story has to include mechanisms of participation
and communicate what the target audience can do to help the campaign
achieve its goal.
The given principles can be helpful to examine political communication as
the type of communication whose goal is associated not just with transmitting
a message but making sure that the message resonates with its consumers, is
properly delivered with regard to the online and offline channels applied and
motivates to become an active part of the story.

The narrative structure of the Donald Trump campaign
Targeted story
There are certain demographics that traditionally constitute the base of a
Republican candidate in the modern era of US politics, such as Evangelicals
and free-marketers. As the Election Day exit polls show, Donald Trump
managed to consolidate 90 per cent of the traditional Republican base (Huang
et al. 2016). But in the election of 2016, Donald Trump as a storyteller had
a major line for another demographic which he called ‘forgotten men and
forgotten women’. According to Jay Connaughton, who led the advertising
effort of the Trump campaign, their ads focused specifically on that group of
voters (Brown 2017).
The white working class of rural America constituted the base of the
group, but an average Trump voter was not necessarily poorly educated or
economically struggling as Trump also won 61 per cent of the vote from
white college-educated men, for instance (Sasson 2016). To understand the
target audience of the narrative Trump created, one should step away from
operating traditional demographic categories. Forgotten men and forgotten
women are the people who ‘want their country back […] want America back’
(Trump 2017g); the middle-class American people who ‘built our country’
(Trump 2017r); who are ‘the heart and soul of the nation’ (Trump 2017m) and
who one day found themselves excluded from the political process, voiceless to affect it. According to a survey by RAND Corporation, voicelessness
was the unifying trait within the Trump movement’s self-identity (Pollard and
Mendelsohn 2016).
The demographic of ‘forgotten men and forgotten women’ is artificial in
the sense that Donald Trump did not simply choose it as his target audience: he created it. Trump supporters of the Rust Belt states did not exist as
a distinctive group of voters before they were ‘summoned’ as a group by the
narrative crafted by the Trump campaign. The symbolic power of a narrator
to reshape social reality and ‘summon’ social groups as if out of nowhere –
simply by naming them – was first stressed by Pierre Bourdieu. He attributed ‘symbolic power to nominate’ (Bourdieu 1985: 734) to a ‘spokesperson’
who ‘institutes the group through the magical operation that is inherent in
any act of naming’ (Bourdieu 1985: 741). United by the narrative of the Trump
campaign, its target audience could make sense of themselves as a distinctive
group with shared interests.
The demographic of forgotten men and forgotten women crosses the lines
of social, ideological and racial groups. As has just been said, people can make
sense of themselves through narratives and thus are capable of redefining
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themselves and entering political alliances of a more reflective nature than
based merely on their racial identity, gender or social status . The appeal to ‘the
forgotten Americans’ as an attempt to extend the traditional Republican base
was made with regard to the people of colour, for instance. On reaching out
to the black and latino communities, the Trump campaign made an attempt to
portray them as a genuine part of the forgotten men and women group and
‘invite’ them into the new demographic by saying:
You’ve got nothing to lose […] They [Democrats] come in for your vote.
They get your vote. Then they do nothing. I’m also going to fight to help
millions of Latinos trapped in poverty and to help their children grow
up in safety and in peace.
(Trump 2017l)
One might say that the strategy paid some dividends, since Trump captured
29 per cent of the latino vote – 2 per cent more than Mitt Romney did in
2012 – and 8 per cent of the African American vote, compared to Romney’s 6
per cent (Munro 2016). Considering the racial controversies haunting Donald
Trump throughout the campaign, this was the remarkable success of his narrative. Trump did not try to turn those demographics into Republicans, instead
he used his narrative to reorient the group self-identification of those people
from racial to that constructed by Trump.

Empathic story
The narrative reflected the concerns of its target audience and gave its own
explanation for what caused the problems. According to the narrative structure of the Trump campaign, America is in decline and the challenges America
faces today threaten its ‘very way of life’ (Trump 2017d). The anti-American
ideology that makes America ‘not so great’ is globalism, ‘shipping your jobs,
your factories, and your wealth to other countries’, promoting open borders
so that Americans ‘don’t have a country anymore’, welcoming immigration
from ‘terror-prone regions’, and so on (Trump 2017w). The narrative structure
unfolded, putting the blame on those by whom the forgotten Americans were
forgotten: ‘the entire corrupt Washington establishment’ (Trump 2017u).
The message of anti-globalism resonated with many working class
people of Middle America. The rural areas of the old industrial states have
been witnessing a mass exodus of manufacturing jobs through the last few
decades (Ohanian 2014). The negative tendency was intensified – according to
Trump (2017j) – by the United States signing the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, which created a free trade zone between the
United States, Canada and Mexico and encouraged thousands of American
manufacturers to seek a cheaper labour force beyond the southern border.
While some attribute the problems of the Rust Belt workers to their limited
ability to adjust, Trump’s narrative made a clear choice between individual and
system blame approaches, ‘the belief that the responsibility for a group’s low
status in society is attributable either to individual failings or to inequities in
the social system’ (Miller et al. 1981: 497), suggesting that the ‘rigged system’
was responsible for what he later called the ‘American carnage’ (Trump 2017b).
According to the narrative, ‘crooked media’ is a ‘part of the rigged system’
(Trump 2017c). Donald Trump enthusiastically pushed the idea of an illegitimate media, labelling professional journalists ‘the most dishonest people’
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(Key 2016). His campaign systematically questioned the right of the professional media to speak for the people (Trump 2017a). It was supported by the
overall low confidence of Americans in the mass media. In 2016 that confidence dropped to the lowest level ever recorded based on the Gallup poll.
As of September 2016, mainstream media was trusted by 32 per cent of
Americans, which indicates the fall by 8 per cent vs 2015. Among Republican
voters the trust in ‘elite’ media sank to 14 per cent to compare with 33 per cent
only a year before (Swift 2016). On this point, Trump blamed the media for
being arrogant and money-centred:
The media is entitled, condescending and even contemptuous of the
people who don’t share their elitist views. And this is all for money. This
is for money, largely, money and power. I see you and I hear you. I am
your voice.
(2017t)

Happy ending story
Trump’s narrative provided solutions to the concerns of its target audience,
repeating that he was not running ‘to be President of the World’, but rather
‘to be President of the United States’ (2017x). The Trump team coined catchphrases for each of their proposals and turned them into popular memes, so
that everybody might easily see what the campaign stood for:
1. ‘Make America Great Again’, the official slogan of the campaign.
2. ‘Build the wall’ between Mexico and the United States to stop illegal immigration, insisting that ‘Mexico will pay for it’.
3. ‘Drain the swamp’ to get rid of the anti-American globalist establishment.
4. ‘America first’, opposing the globalist policies of his political opponents.
5. ‘I will be the greatest jobs president that God ever created’, with regard to
the main topic of the campaign: unemployment and low pay.
6. Loosening ‘job-killing regulations’ to help businesses to create new jobs.
7. ‘Biggest tax cuts since Ronald Reagan’ would create jobs and economic
stability, etc.
A fact that sometimes goes unnoticed is that Donald Trump’s rhetoric of
bringing back jobs was market-oriented and included measures of deregulation and tax cuts. What is almost unprecedented here is that the surge in
support for this platform came from the working class that, traditionally, was
deemed the fiefdom of the left, champions of boosting government expenditure. By pointing at the causal relationship between the right-wing economic
policies and job creation, Donald Trump brought the working class into the
conservative tent.
However, the most important feature of Trump’s narrative was that it
went beyond addressing specific issues and created a story of the people
Trump called the ‘forgotten men and women’. In the narrative, forgotten
men and forgotten women did not just want their jobs back, but the dignity
they deserved. In Trump’s words, it was a movement about ‘restoring respect
for America’ (2017p) and ‘the dignity of all Americans’ (2017k). ‘You are the
people that built our country and we are going to give you the respect that you
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deserve’ (Trump 2017s) was the message addressing the people who viewed
themselves as ‘the heart and soul of the nation’ (Trump 2017m), and who felt
that they deserved a voice because of that status. With respect to the narrative,
a general eagerness for change rather than any specific vision of political shift
was the driving force of the campaign.
‘Forgotten men and forgotten women will be forgotten no longer’ was
the message of change that mattered most to the people who voted in 2016.
According to the New York Times exit poll of 8 November, 90 per cent of those
who said the country was doing well voted for Hillary Clinton, while 83 per
cent of those who highlighted the ability to bring change as the most important quality in the candidate voted for Donald Trump (Huang et al. 2016). The
‘forgotten men and forgotten women will be forgotten no longer’ catchphrase
encapsulated what kind of difference the Republican candidate would bring to
Washington. As Trump put it, ‘my message is that things have to change – and
they have to change right now’ (2017e).

Consistent story
In Mark McKinnon’s view, ‘[w]inning campaigns create a narrative architecture that ties it all together into something meaningful and coherent’
(McKinnon 2016). The narrative the Trump campaign produced was consistent throughout the election period. The ‘Make America Great Again’ slogan
became an umbrella demand for all the claims the campaign made to defend
Americanism. The narrative was consistent in portraying the American decline
in all spheres of social, economic and cultural life.
The most important messages of the narrative were repeated dozens
of times, one speech after another, so that the narrative stayed consistent
geographically along the ‘road tour’ of the candidate. For instance, his story
about making America win was one of the most popular at Trump rallies:
We’re going to start winning again. We’re going to win so much if you
people are going to be angry at me. You’re going to say, Mr. President
you’re winning too much. We’re not used to it, we cannot take it
anymore. Please stop winning. And you know what I’m going to say?
Sorry, folks, we have a lot of ground to capture.
(Trump 2017h)
Depending on the state, Trump would change his catchphrase: ‘the people
of Pennsylvania […] they’re sick and tired of winning. They can’t stand winning
so much’ (Trump 2017i) or ‘the people of North Carolina are sick and tired of
winning. You’re winning too much […]’ (Trump 2017q).

Well-delivered story
The Trump campaign used multiple platforms to disseminate its narrative,
both online and offline. Brad Parscale, the Trump campaign digital director,
pinpointed the multiplatform approach by stressing that the ‘science that was
missed in the previous [Republican] campaigns was to take the digital, and
mix TV, ground game, door knocking’ (2016).
While the Trump campaign was not necessarily an example of successful transmedia storytelling, it did comply with some of Henry Jenkins’ ‘Seven
Principles of Transmedia Entertainment’, e.g. immersion and extractability. As
Jenkins writes,
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in immersion, the consumer enters into the world of the story (e.g.
theme parks), while in extractability, the fan takes aspects of the story
away with them as resources they deploy in the spaces of their everyday
life (e.g. items from the gift shop).
(2010)
Concerning the principle of immersion, Donald Trump made more than
200 stops, giving speeches across the country over the course of his campaign
(Presidential Campaign Travel 2016). Days before the vote, the Trump
campaign focused on the Midwest region by rallying in Iowa, Minnesota,
Michigan and Pennsylvania, the home states of the Rust Belt’s forgotten men
and women (Finnegan 2016). High turnouts at Trump rallies proved how
enthusiastic Trump supporters were about the campaign (Gibson 2016).
The famous red Make America Great Again cap exemplifies the extractability principle of transmedia storytelling. It became the true symbol of the
Trump movement. The popularity of the Make America Great Again hat
contributed to building the Trump movement’s self-identity, since possessions
play an important role in ‘the construction of a coherent identity narrative’
(Schembri et al. 2010: 624).
Trump’s communication strategy was in-line with his claim of mainstream
media being a part of the ‘rigged system’. By 20 September 2016, the Clinton
campaign had spent $143.2 million on TV ads while the Trump campaign had
spent only $6.8 million (Struyk 2016). By prioritizing targeted social media
promotion over big spending on TV in the last few days before the election,
‘the campaign and Republican Party spent about $5 million in get-out-thevote digital advertising’, targeted to Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and
Florida (The Associated Press 2016).
Following the multiplatform approach, Donald Trump turned to online
advertising and the use of his personal social media accounts to address
people directly. With three million Twitter followers on the day he announced
his candidacy for the presidency, Trump ended up with thirteen million by
Election Day. His notable use of Twitter early in the morning and late at night
helped him to affect the news agenda for the day ahead (Keegan 2016).

Well-communicated story
Trump’s campaign manager, Kellyanne Conway, claimed that the 2016 US
presidential election proved the importance of ‘a good message and a great
messenger’ (Conway 2016). As a narrator, Donald Trump equated himself with
his audience of forgotten men and women, asserting that, ‘for those who feel
like they don’t have a voice, I have a simple reply: I am your voice’ (Trump
2017n). In so doing, Trump shattered the invisible wall between the narrator and his audience. Presenting himself as ‘just a messenger’ (Trump 2017f),
Trump portrayed himself as an ‘ideal conductor’ for the ideology of his movement, not distorted by his own interests or biases. It also allowed him to
ascribe the origins of the group ideology to the group itself, not the campaign.
This increased the trustworthiness of the message.
This narrative channelled the image of Donald Trump as an agent of
change, qualified to deliver. In TV ads, Trump accentuated his business
success and promised ‘to bring the same leadership of success to the presidency’ (Parry-Giles et al. 2016). At the same time, Trump took advantage of
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positioning himself as an outsider to politics who sacrificed his glamorous way
of life to change the lives of hard-working Americans for the better. On this
matter, Trump emphasized: ‘I’m an outsider. I’ve become an outsider fighting
for you. I’m not a politician. You, the American people, are my only special
interest’ (2017s). One should not underestimate how greatly the Republican
hopeful benefited from being a famous TV personality and celebrity person
for decades.

Engaging story
To a great extent, the Trump campaign was successful because its narrative
practices motivated its target audience to participate. The importance of being
an active supporter and participating in the campaign was stressed by the
candidate himself:
Our movement – and this is our movement – will take our country back.
But we have to do this together. You have to knock on doors. You have to
pick up that phone. Go to the website. Learn more. Become a volunteer.
That’s what we need.
(Trump 2017v)
In his speeches, Trump coached and motivated his audience, trying to
instil confidence in them and create a positive self-image: ‘You are the smartest people. We’re the strongest people. We’re the most loyal people ever to
be involved in a campaign’ (2017o). Encouraging and creating a positive selfimage within subordinate groups may lead to a greater turnout on election
day, as Miller et al. suggest:
Voting may have been depressed among the elderly because they have
accepted the generally negative image of old people in U.S. society
and have no visible activist wing to help them reinterpret their social
attributes into a positive self-image (e.g., ‘black is beautiful’) and subsequently to motivate them to engage in activities on the group’s behalf.
(1981: 501)
The group consciousness constructed by the narrative could lead to
higher participation rates among the group of forgotten men and women, as
some researchers argue with respect to the African American community, for
instance (McClain et al. 2009: 478). Voting is probably the most important kind
of political participation – at least for a candidate. Miller et al. point out that
[m]embers of subordinate strata will turn out at higher rates if they
perceive their self-location within a particular social stratum (i.e., think
of themselves black, poor, or female), regard their group as relatively
lacking in societal influence compared with an opposing group (whites,
businessmen, and men, respectively), and at the same time attribute
their deprived condition to social barrier.
(1981: 500)
As has been discussed, the Trump campaign successfully created a movement with a distinctive and well-outlined group identification, fiercely
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criticized the polar power of the globalist elites and put system blame at the
centre of the narrative, attributing the problems of the working class to the
negligence and incompetence of the Washington establishment. Through
the triadic model of group identification, polar power and system blame, the
strong enthusiasm of the Trump movement may be explained.

Conclusion
As a result of the study, it may be argued that Donald Trump managed to foresee the target group that did not fall into traditional demographics patterns;
one that required an insight to be seen. The Trump campaign formulated and
channelled a consistent message of change to its target audience, the group
of ‘forgotten men and forgotten women’. It was crucial that Trump’s narrative of change went beyond addressing specific issues of social, economic and
cultural life, and created a story of the people who did not just want their
jobs back but their dignity, too. The narrative resonated with the very personal
feelings of the people who viewed themselves as ‘the heart and soul of the
nation’, but found themselves powerless to affect the destinies of their country. By constructing a group identity for his target audience, Trump boosted
enthusiasm amongst his base and promoted participation, from rallies to
the actual Election Day turnout. A multiplatform approach to disseminating
campaign messages made the campaign more vibrant and supported the part
of the narrative that portrayed mainstream media as part of a untrustworthy establishment. Along with constructing an identity for forgotten men and
women and building the image of the polar power, the narrative put system
blame at its core, attributing the problems of its target audience to the negligence and incompetence of the Washington elite.
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